1. Introduction 1.1 - Introduction 1.2 - The elements of the problem 1.3 - The intertemporal development of the relationship and the reference framework 1.4 - Types of asymmetric information problems 2. The bas emodel 2.1 - Introduction 2.2 - Description of the model 2.3 - Symmetric information contracts 3. The moral Hazard problem 3.1 - Introduction 3.2 - The moral Hazard Problem 3.3 - The agent chooses between two effort levels 3.4 - Solution using the first-order approach 3.5 - A simple case with continuos effort 3.6 - Moral Hazard with Hidden information 3.7 - Some comments on the simple moral Hazard models 3A. Complementary material 3B. Applications 3C. Advanced themes 4. The adverse selection problem 4.1 - Introduction 4.2 - A model of adverse selection 4.3 - When principals compete for agents 4.4 Adverse selecion with a continuum of possible types 4.5 - Comments 4A. Complementary material 4B. Applications 4C. Advanced themes 5. Signalling 5.1 - Introduction 5.2 - The value of private information and of signalling 5.3 - Education as a signal 5.4 - The agents signal their characteristic 5.5 - The informational power of contracts 5.6 - Comments 5A. Complementary material 5B. Applications 5C. Advanced themes Mathematical appendix: concavity and optimization References Solution to the exercises Index

Tradutor: Richard Watt