<style type="text/css"> .wpb_animate_when_almost_visible { opacity: 1; }</style> Enap catalog › Details for: The architecture of cooperation :
Normal view MARC view ISBD view

The architecture of cooperation : managing coordination costs and appropriation concerns in strategic alliances

By: GULATI, Ranjay.
Contributor(s): SINGH, Harbir.
Material type: materialTypeLabelArticlePublisher: Ithaca : Johnson Graduate School of Management, December 1998Administrative Science Quarterly 43, 4, p. 781-814Abstract: This study examines why firms choose different governance structures across their alliances. We focus on the coordination costs in alliances. We focus on the coordination costs in alliances that arise from interdependence of tasks across organizational boundaries and the related complexity of ongoing activities to be completed jointly or individually. We use a typology of alliance governance structures that differentiates structures by the magnitude of hierarchical control to test hypotheses predicting alternative contractual choices. We use empirical data on alliance annoucements in three worldwide industries over 20-year period to assess which factors explain the choice of alliance types. The findings suggest that the magnitude of hierarchical controls in contractual relationships such as alliances is influenced by the anticipated coordination costs and by expected appropriation concerns
Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.
    average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)
No physical items for this record

This study examines why firms choose different governance structures across their alliances. We focus on the coordination costs in alliances. We focus on the coordination costs in alliances that arise from interdependence of tasks across organizational boundaries and the related complexity of ongoing activities to be completed jointly or individually. We use a typology of alliance governance structures that differentiates structures by the magnitude of hierarchical control to test hypotheses predicting alternative contractual choices. We use empirical data on alliance annoucements in three worldwide industries over 20-year period to assess which factors explain the choice of alliance types. The findings suggest that the magnitude of hierarchical controls in contractual relationships such as alliances is influenced by the anticipated coordination costs and by expected appropriation concerns

There are no comments for this item.

Log in to your account to post a comment.

Click on an image to view it in the image viewer

Escola Nacional de Administração Pública

Escola Nacional de Administração Pública

Endereço:

  • Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos
  • Funcionamento: segunda a sexta-feira, das 9h às 19h
  • +55 61 2020-3139 / biblioteca@enap.gov.br
  • SPO Área Especial 2-A
  • CEP 70610-900 - Brasília/DF
<
Acesso à Informação TRANSPARÊNCIA

Powered by Koha