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Value Pluralism and Contemporary Political Philosophy

By: GALSTON, William A.
Material type: materialTypeLabelArticlePublisher: New York, NY : Cambridge University Pres, December 1999American Political Science Review 93, 4, p. 769-778Abstract: Budding on suggestions by Isaiah Berlin, a number of thinkers have elaborated a moral theory of value B pluralism. Berlin himself believed that value pluralism was consistent with liberalism, which he understood as a political theory giving great weight to the value of negative liberty. Theorists led by John Gray have argued, however, that Berlin's pluralist stance toward values is not consistent with his commitment to liberalism. Gray's critique has triggered a wide-ranging theoretical debate, and the purpose of this article is to assess that debate. I sketch the essentials of value pluralism and explore its implications for liberal political theory. I conclude that Gray's argument modifies our understanding of liberal democracy but does not drive a wedge between value pluralism and liberal democratic theory. Nevertheless, it underscores the importance of prudence and attention to specific circumstances when using liberal democratic norms to guide the reform of illiberal institutions.
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Budding on suggestions by Isaiah Berlin, a number of thinkers have elaborated a moral theory of value B pluralism. Berlin himself believed that value pluralism was consistent with liberalism, which he understood as a political theory giving great weight to the value of negative liberty. Theorists led by John Gray have argued, however, that Berlin's pluralist stance toward values is not consistent with his commitment to liberalism. Gray's critique has triggered a wide-ranging theoretical debate, and the purpose of this article is to assess that debate. I sketch the essentials of value pluralism and explore its implications for liberal political theory. I conclude that Gray's argument modifies our understanding of liberal democracy but does not drive a wedge between value pluralism and liberal democratic theory. Nevertheless, it underscores the importance of prudence and attention to specific circumstances when using liberal democratic norms to guide the reform of illiberal institutions.

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