An elitist Plato, opposed to democracy and hostile to the masses, fills the literature. In the midst of an extensive philological and grammatical commentary on Plato's Republic, James Adam (1902, 2.24, ad loc. 494a) includes the following brief but telling observation: "The theory of Ideas is not a democratic philosophy." He writes this in response to an interchange between Socrates and Adeimantus concerning the access of the many to the idea or form of the Good, during which Socrates claims: "It is impossible for the multitude to be philosophic." Only a few will have access to the forms (eide).(1) A profound inequality of rule and authority seems to follow from that unequal access. I could begin with Adam's assertion that the theory of ideas is not a democratic philosophy, but the basis for my argument derives from a very different perspective, an epistemological one that has nothing to do with the capabilities, or lack thereof, of the many to attain a vision of the Good. Rather, I focus on the theory of the forms as a mechanism for categorization, opposing epistemologically, politically, and psychologically the openness of democracy. While Adam and numerous others see elitism in the Platonic theory of the forms because the many cannot ascend to a philosophic vision,(2) I attend to the opposition between democracy and that theory to illustrate how Socrates' discussion in Book 8 of the Republic points to democracy's dependence on a "formlessness" that challenges claims of equality and of identity within democratic regimes.