The political role of the State in Cambridgre theories of growth and distribution
By: CHARLES, Sébatien
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In this paper we extend Kaldors Neo-Pasinetti theorem to the scope of budgetary interventions based on political orientations. First, we take into account a system of taxes and expenditures. Second, we introduce different reaction functions for public spending showing the political role of the State in Cambridge theory of distribution. It turns out that the validity of Kaldorian results depends on the political orientation adopted by government, which diminishes the range of application of the Neo-Pasinetti theorem
Revista de Economia Política
Outubro Dezembro 2007
v. 27 n. 4 (108)
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