The brazilian swindle and the larger international manetary problem
By: GALBRAITH, James K
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Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: São Paulo : Editora 34, jan./mar. 2003Revista de Economia Política = Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 23, 1, p. 85-95Abstract: The IMFs recent loan to Brazil is best seen as a mechanism of political control rather than economic assistance, except in a very unsustainable short run. Thus hard choices between the priorities of Brazils working population and those of international creditors cannot be avoided. This essay explores policy options, and goes on to suggest that while the financial sector is certain to dominate American policy discussion in these matters, it would be wiser to view the larger national economic interest of the United States as aligned with those who advocate stable and sustainable national development in Brazil
The IMFs recent loan to Brazil is best seen as a mechanism of political control rather than economic assistance, except in a very unsustainable short run. Thus hard choices between the priorities of Brazils working population and those of international creditors cannot be avoided. This essay explores policy options, and goes on to suggest that while the financial sector is certain to dominate American policy discussion in these matters, it would be wiser to view the larger national economic interest of the United States as aligned with those who advocate stable and sustainable national development in Brazil
Revista de Economia Política
Janeiro-Março 2003
v. 23, n. 1(89)
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