Heterarchies and developmental traps
By: BRUSZT, Laszlo
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ArticlePublisher: São Paulo : Editora 34, jan./mar. 2001Revista de Economia Política = Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 21, 1 , p. 3-20Abstract: State capacity to resist powerful predatory economic groups is highly dependent on the way social diversity is represented within the polity. Such state capacity is weak when a single branch of government can usurp the representation of public good between two elections. In some democracies that I call heterarchies, coalition partners, parties in different houses of the legislature, different levels and branches of government, autonomous state agencies compel executives to take into account diverse modes of representation while making their programs and policies. Such constraints on executive authority allow the state to rise above the direct distribution of powers and interests within the economy. In the paper I use the Russian case to analyze the relationship between state weakness and the related problems of economic development
State capacity to resist powerful predatory economic groups is highly dependent on the way social diversity is represented within the polity. Such state capacity is weak when a single branch of government can usurp the representation of public good between two elections. In some democracies that I call heterarchies, coalition partners, parties in different houses of the legislature, different levels and branches of government, autonomous state agencies compel executives to take into account diverse modes of representation while making their programs and policies. Such constraints on executive authority allow the state to rise above the direct distribution of powers and interests within the economy. In the paper I use the Russian case to analyze the relationship between state weakness and the related problems of economic development
Revista de Economia Política 2001
v. 21, n. 1(81)
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