Estrutura de propriedade e eficiência : uma análise com teoria dos incentivos
By: BRITTO, Paulo Augusto P. de
.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: São Paulo : Editora 34, jul./set. 1999Revista de Economia Política = Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 19, 3, p. 57-66Abstract: This article discusses the influence of the ownership structure over the efficiency. The framework used is the incentive theory, in which the principal must build an incentive scheme, which induces an agent to act optimally. First, we verify the reasons for public intervention in industries with market failure. Following, we study the deterioration of the incentive structure over managers as a result of the ownership change. So, we verify how the structure of incentives can be restored with the firms privatization, with the maintenance, by the government, of some control over the firm. Finally, we make a brief exposition about the regulatory instruments
This article discusses the influence of the ownership structure over the efficiency. The framework used is the incentive theory, in which the principal must build an incentive scheme, which induces an agent to act optimally. First, we verify the reasons for public intervention in industries with market failure. Following, we study the deterioration of the incentive structure over managers as a result of the ownership change. So, we verify how the structure of incentives can be restored with the firms privatization, with the maintenance, by the government, of some control over the firm. Finally, we make a brief exposition about the regulatory instruments
Revista de Economía Política 1999
v. 19, n. 3(75)
Click on an image to view it in the image viewer
There are no comments for this item.