Central banking, democratic governance and political authority : the case of Brazil in a comparative perspective
By: Sola, Lourdes
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Contributor(s): GARMAN, Christopher | MARQUES Moises.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: São Paulo : Editora 34, abr./jun . 1998Revista de Economia Política = Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 18, 2 , p. 106-130Abstract: By examining the relationship between democratic governance and monetary authority this paper accomplishes two principal tasks. First, it justifies placing the study of monetary authority as a central item on the research agenda of political scientists. Beginning from the premise central banks constitute a special mode of political authority, we examine trade-offs between questions of transparency, democratic accountability, and public sector efficiency. Second, by conducting an empirical study of monetary authority for the Brazilian case, the paper inverts a common held assumption within the study of central banks. Rather than argue price stability follows from an autonomous central bank, the Brazilian case demonstrate nearly the opposite can take place
By examining the relationship between democratic governance and monetary authority this paper accomplishes two principal tasks. First, it justifies placing the study of monetary authority as a central item on the research agenda of political scientists. Beginning from the premise central banks constitute a special mode of political authority, we examine trade-offs between questions of transparency, democratic accountability, and public sector efficiency. Second, by conducting an empirical study of monetary authority for the Brazilian case, the paper inverts a common held assumption within the study of central banks. Rather than argue price stability follows from an autonomous central bank, the Brazilian case demonstrate nearly the opposite can take place
Revista de Editora Política 1998
v. 18, n. 2(70)
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