A inflação brasileira e a teoria de jogos
By: HANEKE, Uwe
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ArticlePublisher: São Paulo : Nobel, out./dez. 1995Revista de Economia Política = Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 15, 4, p. 84-98Abstract: Based on the disaggregation of the private sector as an amplification of the well-known Barro & Gordon policy-game model, a coordination and/or cooperation problem of the price-setters in the private sector is identified as a possible cause for the persistence of inflation even during stabilization efforts. This kind of persistence is, at least in the short-term, independent from the willingness of the government to stop inflation. A process of self-fulfilling prophecies is started by the wait-and-see behavior of private sectors price-setters, which can result in the giving up of the stabilization policy. Breaking this wait-and-see behavior could be one of the major problems in stabilizing economies with chronic high inflation
Based on the disaggregation of the private sector as an amplification of the well-known Barro & Gordon policy-game model, a coordination and/or cooperation problem of the price-setters in the private sector is identified as a possible cause for the persistence of inflation even during stabilization efforts. This kind of persistence is, at least in the short-term, independent from the willingness of the government to stop inflation. A process of self-fulfilling prophecies is started by the wait-and-see behavior of private sectors price-setters, which can result in the giving up of the stabilization policy. Breaking this wait-and-see behavior could be one of the major problems in stabilizing economies with chronic high inflation
Revista de Economia Política 1995
v. 15, n. 4(60)
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