A independência do banco Central e a disciplina monetária : observações céticas
By: CARVALHO, Fernando J. Cardim de
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ArticlePublisher: São Paulo : Nobel, out./dez. 1995Revista de Economia Política = Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 15, 4, p. 134Abstract: Orthodox conventional wisdom related to monetary policy in the 1990s presents the independence of central banks as a condition for achieving durable price stability, as it did with respect to the adoption of fixed rules for monetary growth in the 1980s. The paper proceeds to a critical examination of the arguments, in which it is concluded that, besides the undesirable political implications of the proposal, the thesis is too dependent on specious and fragile concepts as the natural rate of unemployment and the allegedly inherent inflationary bias of monetary authorities as well as on a very narrow view of the role of monetary authorities
Orthodox conventional wisdom related to monetary policy in the 1990s presents the independence of central banks as a condition for achieving durable price stability, as it did with respect to the adoption of fixed rules for monetary growth in the 1980s. The paper proceeds to a critical examination of the arguments, in which it is concluded that, besides the undesirable political implications of the proposal, the thesis is too dependent on specious and fragile concepts as the natural rate of unemployment and the allegedly inherent inflationary bias of monetary authorities as well as on a very narrow view of the role of monetary authorities
Revista de Economia Política 1995
v. 15, n. 4(60)
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