Banco Nacional : jogo de Ponzi, PROER e FCVS
By: BARBOSA, Fernando de Holanda
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ArticlePublisher: São Paulo : Editora 34, jan./mar. 2008Revista de Economia Política = Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 28, 1, p. 97-115Abstract: This paper analyses the causes of the failure of Banco Nacional and the resolution method adopted by the Brazilian central bank. The program (PROER) designed by the central bank and its legal framework allowed the failed bank to buy defaulted securities, financed by the central bank, and to use them as borrowing collateral. The paper also analyses the private and social costs of this bank failure
This paper analyses the causes of the failure of Banco Nacional and the resolution method adopted by the Brazilian central bank. The program (PROER) designed by the central bank and its legal framework allowed the failed bank to buy defaulted securities, financed by the central bank, and to use them as borrowing collateral. The paper also analyses the private and social costs of this bank failure
v. 28, n. 1(109)
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