Critical reflexions on hamiltonian perspectives on rule-making and legislative proposal initiatives by the chief executive
By: NEWBOLD, Stephanie P
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Contributor(s): Rosenbloom, David H.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: Malden, MA : Blackwell Publishers, November / December 2007Public administration review : PAR 67, 6, p. 1049-1056Abstract: Reflecting on James Hart and Edwin Wittes analysis affords the field a rare opportunity to observe the complexities of a separation-of-powers system in action. In making their case, they underscored the importance of the president having a substantial supervisory role in the way administrative agencies write rules and propose legislative measures. As a result, they ignored Congresss constitutional responsibility to supervise, regulate, and guide these areas of administrative law. Their highly controversial arguments not only provide the field with a broader understanding of the overall mission of the Brownlow Committee, but also we can see how they influenced the development of the administrative state
Reflecting on James Hart and Edwin Wittes analysis affords the field a rare opportunity to observe the complexities of a separation-of-powers system in action. In making their case, they underscored the importance of the president having a substantial supervisory role in the way administrative agencies write rules and propose legislative measures. As a result, they ignored Congresss constitutional responsibility to supervise, regulate, and guide these areas of administrative law. Their highly controversial arguments not only provide the field with a broader understanding of the overall mission of the Brownlow Committee, but also we can see how they influenced the development of the administrative state
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