Democratic constitutional design and public policy : analysis and evidence
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BookPublisher: Cambridge : The Mit, 2006Description: 373 p.ISBN: 0262532808.Subject(s): Ciência Política | Política Pública | Justiça Eleitoral | Democracia | Forma de Estado| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Livro Geral | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Livro Geral | 4D3833d (Browse shelf) | 1 | Available | 10011633 |
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| 4C7642c CONTRAGOLPES : | 4C8375l Les libertes publiques en France et dans le monde | 4C871g Geostrategie de l'Atlantique sud | 4D3833d Democratic constitutional design and public policy : | 4E822e Estrategia no novo cenario mundial | 4F3631f Florestan Fernandes : | 4F717p Planning in the face of power |
1. Introduction: Rational choice politics and institutions - Roger D. Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg I. Voting systems, agency, and public policy 2. Direct democracy: designing a living constitution - Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer 3. Constitutions and economic policy - Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini 4. Party-line voting and committee assignments in the mixed-member system - Thomas Stratmann II. Legislative decisions and structure and policy outcomes 5. The effects of constitutions on coalition governments in parliamentary democracies - Daniel Diermeier, Hülya Eraslan, and Antonio Merlo 6. On the merits of bicameral legislatures: Intragovernmental bargaining and policy stability - Roger D. Congleton 7. Bicameralism and political compromise in representative democracy - John Charles Bradbury and W. Mark Crain III. Decentralization and Federalism 8. Federalism: A constitutional perspective - Dennis C. Mueller 9. Common tax pool problems in federal systems - Brian Knight IV. Legal institutions, regulation, and economic growth 10. Judicial independence and economic development - Lars P. Feld and Stefan Voigt 11. Constitutions and prosperity: The impact of legal and economic institutions on the wealth of nations - Randall G. Holcombe, Robert A. Lawson, and James D. Gwartney V. Constitutional design, durability, and stability 12. Amendment procedures and constitutional stability - Bjorn Erik Rasch and Roger D. Congleton 13. Designing constitutional stability - Barry R. Weingast
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