<style type="text/css"> .wpb_animate_when_almost_visible { opacity: 1; }</style> Enap catalog › Details for: Effort, performance, and conscientiousness :
Normal view MARC view ISBD view

Effort, performance, and conscientiousness : an agency theory perspective

By: FONG, Eric A.
Contributor(s): TOSI JR., Henry L.
Material type: materialTypeLabelArticlePublisher: London, UK : Sage Publications, April 2007Journal of Management : J.O.M 33, 2, p. 161-179Abstract: The authors examine the moderating effects of conscientiousness on the relationships between agency controls and effort and agency controls and task performance. Results show that less conscientious individuals appear to increase effort through incentive alignment and monitoring, whereas conscientious individuals do not shirk with or without agency controls. Furthermore, results show that less conscientious individuals increase task performance through incentive alignment, but not through monitoring. The study confirms that motivation to act opportunistically differs between individuals unlike what is assumed by agency theory. Also, incentive alignment may be more effective than monitoring when attempting to align principal and agent interests
Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.
    average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)
No physical items for this record

The authors examine the moderating effects of conscientiousness on the relationships between agency controls and effort and agency controls and task performance. Results show that less conscientious individuals appear to increase effort through incentive alignment and monitoring, whereas conscientious individuals do not shirk with or without agency controls. Furthermore, results show that less conscientious individuals increase task performance through incentive alignment, but not through monitoring. The study confirms that motivation to act opportunistically differs between individuals unlike what is assumed by agency theory. Also, incentive alignment may be more effective than monitoring when attempting to align principal and agent interests

There are no comments for this item.

Log in to your account to post a comment.

Click on an image to view it in the image viewer

Escola Nacional de Administração Pública

Escola Nacional de Administração Pública

Endereço:

  • Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos
  • Funcionamento: segunda a sexta-feira, das 9h às 19h
  • +55 61 2020-3139 / biblioteca@enap.gov.br
  • SPO Área Especial 2-A
  • CEP 70610-900 - Brasília/DF
<
Acesso à Informação TRANSPARÊNCIA

Powered by Koha