EU political accession conditionality after the 2004 enlargement : consistency and effectiveness
By: SCHIMMELFENNIG, Frank.
Material type: ArticlePublisher: Oxfordshire, UK : Taylor & Francis, September 2008Journal of European Public Policy 15, 6, p. 918-937Abstract: Has the EU's political accession conditionality changed after the enlargement of 2004 against the backdrop of apparent 'enlargement fatigue' and domestic obstacles in the remaining non-member countries? Based on an empirical analysis of non-member eligibility and EU discrimination, this article concludes that EU enlargement policy has remained consistently linked to compliance with basic democratic norms in the target countries. The recent drawbacks in the negotiations of the EU with Croatia, Serbia, and Turkey have been caused by issues of national identity related to legacies of ethnic conflict that are likely to create high political costs to the target governments. As a result, whereas consistency has remained high, effectiveness is reduced. The findings confirm the continuing relevance of the external incentives model of EU conditionality after the recent enlargementHas the EU's political accession conditionality changed after the enlargement of 2004 against the backdrop of apparent 'enlargement fatigue' and domestic obstacles in the remaining non-member countries? Based on an empirical analysis of non-member eligibility and EU discrimination, this article concludes that EU enlargement policy has remained consistently linked to compliance with basic democratic norms in the target countries. The recent drawbacks in the negotiations of the EU with Croatia, Serbia, and Turkey have been caused by issues of national identity related to legacies of ethnic conflict that are likely to create high political costs to the target governments. As a result, whereas consistency has remained high, effectiveness is reduced. The findings confirm the continuing relevance of the external incentives model of EU conditionality after the recent enlargement
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