1. Introduction A. An old chestnut is actually two B. Pathologies of ad hoc triangulation C. Functions and institutions 2. Majoritarian democracy and minoritarian constitutionalism A. Judicial review as substantially legitimate protection of minority rights B. Judicial review as procedurelly legitimate protection of democracy C. Moving beyond aggregative majoritarianism and minoritarian constitutionalism 3. From majoritarian to deliberative theories of constitutional democracy A. Deliberative democracy: Four axes of analysis B. Constitutionalism: Four central elements C. Constitutional democracy? 4. Deliberative democracy and substantive constitutionalism A. Keepers of the substantive flame of American exceptionalism B. Guardians of the moral law in the forum of principle C. Are substantialist defenses of judicial review self-defeating? 5. Disagreement and the constitution of democracy A. Democratic precommitment to judicial review: Freeman B. Deliberative majoritarianism and the paternalism of judicial review: Waldron C. Upshot: We need a theory of democratic constitutionalism 6. The seducements of juristic discourse as democratic deliberation A. A division of labor between juristic deliberation and populist aggregation? B. Actual juristic discourse in the United States system of constitutional adjudication C. Legal principles and moral-political reasoning 7. Constitutionalism as the procedural structuring of deliberative democracy A. A provisional summary: Criteria for an adequate theory of constitutional review B. Guardians of the conditions of procedural legitimacy: Habermas 8. The institutions of constitutional review i: Design problems and judicial review A. The problems of designing institutions of constitutional review B. Independent constitutional courts in a concentrated review system 9. The institutions of constitutional review II: horizontal dispersal and vertical empowerment A. Self-review panels in the legislature and regulatory agencies B. Mechanisms for interbranch debate and decisional dispersal C. Easing formal amendability requirements D. Establishing civic constitutional fora