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Privatização e processo decisório

By: FERRAZ, Alexandre Sampaio.
Material type: materialTypeLabelArticlePublisher: Rio de Janeiro : IUPERJ, 2009Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais 52, 2, p. 425-469Abstract: This article examines the political determinants of privatization of the fixed telephony sector in four countries, based on a neo-institutionalist approach. These countries faced similar pressures by telephone companies in favor of privatization, suggesting an apparent convergence in the sector's reorganization. However, although all four adopted some degree of privatization, the process followed different paths and designs in each country. This variation can be explained by the different institutional contexts in which the reforms were carried out. Where there was concentration of power in the Executive, privatization was launched "earlier" and approved more quickly than in countries in which such concentration was less intense. Meanwhile, the existence of multiple veto points and stakeholders with veto adoption by the Executive, forcing the latter to negotiate and form minimum consensus within the governing coalition.
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This article examines the political determinants of privatization of the fixed telephony sector in four countries, based on a neo-institutionalist approach. These countries faced similar pressures by telephone companies in favor of privatization, suggesting an apparent convergence in the sector's reorganization. However, although all four adopted some degree of privatization, the process followed different paths and designs in each country. This variation can be explained by the different institutional contexts in which the reforms were carried out. Where there was concentration of power in the Executive, privatization was launched "earlier" and approved more quickly than in countries in which such concentration was less intense. Meanwhile, the existence of multiple veto points and stakeholders with veto adoption by the Executive, forcing the latter to negotiate and form minimum consensus within the governing coalition.

Privatization; neo-institutionalism; decision-making process; Executive/Legislative relations

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