Leadership and learning in political groups : the management of advice in the iran-contra affair
By: KOWERT, Paul A
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ArticlePublisher: Malden : Wiley-Blackwell, April 2001Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 14, 2, p. 201-232Abstract: For over two decades, the theory of groupthink proposed by Irving Janis has remained the most prominent analysis of group dynamics in policy-making. Suffering from its own popularity, groupthink has become a catch-all phrase without a clear meaning. Moreover, theories of group decision-makingeven when applied to public policy-makinghave typically ignored political variables, focusing almost exclusively on psychological arguments. This article offers three more narrowly construed propositions about policy-making groups: (1) that extremes in the distribution of power within a decision group reduces the integrative complexity of that group's deliberations and, thus, a leader's ability to learn; (2) that extremes in group size produce similar effects; and (3) that the integrative complexity of deliberations is improved when power concentration is appropriate to group size. An examination of the Reagan Administration's decision-making in two phases of the Iran-Contra affair lends support to these hypotheses and reveals the importance of political structure in decision group dynamics.
For over two decades, the theory of groupthink proposed by Irving Janis has remained the most prominent analysis of group dynamics in policy-making. Suffering from its own popularity, groupthink has become a catch-all phrase without a clear meaning. Moreover, theories of group decision-makingeven when applied to public policy-makinghave typically ignored political variables, focusing almost exclusively on psychological arguments. This article offers three more narrowly construed propositions about policy-making groups: (1) that extremes in the distribution of power within a decision group reduces the integrative complexity of that group's deliberations and, thus, a leader's ability to learn; (2) that extremes in group size produce similar effects; and (3) that the integrative complexity of deliberations is improved when power concentration is appropriate to group size. An examination of the Reagan Administration's decision-making in two phases of the Iran-Contra affair lends support to these hypotheses and reveals the importance of political structure in decision group dynamics.
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