The guardian state : a comparative analysis of interest group regulation
By: YISHAI, Yael
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ArticlePublisher: Malden : Wiley-Blackwell, April 1998Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 11, 2, p. 153-176Abstract: This article discusses the regulation of interest groups by the state in four democracies: two liberal, namely Australia and Canada, and two nonliberal, namely Israel and Turkey. The analysis centers on five questions: the scope of regulation, its causes, public reaction to regulation, implementation of regulation, and its impact on state and society. The article suggests that the type of regime does make a difference regarding all parameters of regulation. Liberal democracies tend to regulate strategy of interest groups; regulation is caused by fear of undue associational pressure exerted on decision-makers. The public tends to be hostile to regulation; implementation is strict, but impact on both interest groups and society is modest. Nonliberal democracies tend to regulate interest groups' structure. Regulation is caused by fear of subversion and threats to the state's survival. The public is compliant disregarding regulation. Implementation is lax and impact may be potentially substantial. These hypotheses were largely confirmed in the four cases under consideration.
This article discusses the regulation of interest groups by the state in four democracies: two liberal, namely Australia and Canada, and two nonliberal, namely Israel and Turkey. The analysis centers on five questions: the scope of regulation, its causes, public reaction to regulation, implementation of regulation, and its impact on state and society. The article suggests that the type of regime does make a difference regarding all parameters of regulation. Liberal democracies tend to regulate strategy of interest groups; regulation is caused by fear of undue associational pressure exerted on decision-makers. The public tends to be hostile to regulation; implementation is strict, but impact on both interest groups and society is modest. Nonliberal democracies tend to regulate interest groups' structure. Regulation is caused by fear of subversion and threats to the state's survival. The public is compliant disregarding regulation. Implementation is lax and impact may be potentially substantial. These hypotheses were largely confirmed in the four cases under consideration.
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