Water management in France : delegation and market based
By: CLARK, Ephraim
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Contributor(s): MONDELLO, Gérard.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: New York : Marcel Dekker, 2003International Journal of Public Administration - IJPA 26, 3, p. 317-328Abstract: In this paper, we show that the principle of equal access in the French legal code and the explicit flexibility of the actual delegation contract concerning prices and responsibility for risk have created the conditions for an effective system of market based, auto-regulation that maximizes community welfare while maintaining a fair return for the delegated firm. The system is market based because auto-regulation occurs within price-profit interval over which delegation is acceptable to both parties. For the system to be effective, the threat to revoke must be credible and the conflict of interest between the mayor and the commune must be resolved.
In this paper, we show that the principle of equal access in the French legal code and the explicit flexibility of the actual delegation contract concerning prices and responsibility for risk have created the conditions for an effective system of market based, auto-regulation that maximizes community welfare while maintaining a fair return for the delegated firm. The system is market based because auto-regulation occurs within price-profit interval over which delegation is acceptable to both parties. For the system to be effective, the threat to revoke must be credible and the conflict of interest between the mayor and the commune must be resolved.
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