A teoria da perspectiva e as mudanças de preferência no mainstream : um prospecto Lakatoseano
By: BERGER, Bruno
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Contributor(s): PESSALI, Huáscar Fialho.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: São Paulo : Editora 34, abr./jun. 2010Revista de Economia Política = Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 30, 2, p. 340-356Abstract: The theory of the perspective and the changes of preference in the mainstream: a Lakatosean prospect. For many decades over the 20th Century, the mainstream of economics adopted a normative and axiomatic theory of individual behavior in which maximizing procedures were carried out by rationally unbounded agents. This status has been challenged on many grounds and alternative views from fields like psychology have found a way into the core of economics research frontier. Prospect theory, developed by psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky since the 1970s, has provided a more empirical, inductive and descriptive theory of decision making. It has made significant inroads into mainstream microeconomics, shaking the habits of some of its practitioners. This paper first takes stock of its main developments and then uses a Lakatosian framework to draw out its negative and positive heuristics. In what follows, its heuristics are compared to those of traditional rational decision-making theories. The differences between them are highlighted, pointing to changes in the mainstream of the profession and to new opportunities for research.
The theory of the perspective and the changes of preference in the mainstream: a Lakatosean prospect. For many decades over the 20th Century, the mainstream of economics adopted a normative and axiomatic theory of individual behavior in which maximizing procedures were carried out by rationally unbounded agents. This status has been challenged on many grounds and alternative views from fields like psychology have found a way into the core of economics research frontier. Prospect theory, developed by psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky since the 1970s, has provided a more empirical, inductive and descriptive theory of decision making. It has made significant inroads into mainstream microeconomics, shaking the habits of some of its practitioners. This paper first takes stock of its main developments and then uses a Lakatosian framework to draw out its negative and positive heuristics. In what follows, its heuristics are compared to those of traditional rational decision-making theories. The differences between them are highlighted, pointing to changes in the mainstream of the profession and to new opportunities for research.
v. 30, n. 2(118)
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