Designing a fiscal federal mechanism for the transition period : the case of the Russian federation
By: BIRKENES, Robert M
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ArticlePublisher: New York : Marcel Dekker, 1999International Journal of Public Administration - IJPA 22, 9-10, p. 1429-1500Abstract: In countries undergoing economic transition, economic factors have caused discord between central and regional authorities. This paper explores the causes and consequences of fiscal conflicts between the federal and regional governments and discusses what elements in an optimal fiscal management would best preserve federal integrity. It provides a plausible game-theoretic representation of the power struggle between the center and regional governments in the Russian Federation. This representation describes the rules and political environment that served as a background for the budgetary wars of 1992 to 1994, the objectives of both the regional and federal players, and a history of game play during the transitional period.
In countries undergoing economic transition, economic factors have caused discord between central and regional authorities. This paper explores the causes and consequences of fiscal conflicts between the federal and regional governments and discusses what elements in an optimal fiscal management would best preserve federal integrity. It provides a plausible game-theoretic representation of the power struggle between the center and regional governments in the Russian Federation. This representation describes the rules and political environment that served as a background for the budgetary wars of 1992 to 1994, the objectives of both the regional and federal players, and a history of game play during the transitional period.
Volume 22
Numbers 9-10
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