Democracy in the age of the euro
By: JABKO, Nicolas
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ArticlePublisher: Oxfordshire : Routledge, October 2003Journal of European Public Policy 10, 5, p. 710-739Abstract: The Maastricht Treaty established an independent European Central Bank (ECB) in charge of managing Europe's new currency, the euro. But in recent years, many have expressed fears that the ECB's independence could lead to an undemocratic situation in which central bankers are never held accountable. Based on an analysis of the relations between the ECB and the European Parliament, this article demonstrates the emergence of a certain practice of central bank accountability. This practice, which is both real and limited, can be understood as the result of a power play between central bankers and parliamentarians in the institutional context of the European Union. In the age of the euro and economic globalization, the difficulty of defining a border between expertise and politics casts a new light on a fundamental problem of democracy.
The Maastricht Treaty established an independent European Central Bank (ECB) in charge of managing Europe's new currency, the euro. But in recent years, many have expressed fears that the ECB's independence could lead to an undemocratic situation in which central bankers are never held accountable. Based on an analysis of the relations between the ECB and the European Parliament, this article demonstrates the emergence of a certain practice of central bank accountability. This practice, which is both real and limited, can be understood as the result of a power play between central bankers and parliamentarians in the institutional context of the European Union. In the age of the euro and economic globalization, the difficulty of defining a border between expertise and politics casts a new light on a fundamental problem of democracy.
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