This article tackles the following puzzle. Why is it that we cannot observe much Europeanization of 'Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism' over the past fifty years, while 'Germanness' has spelt European since the end of the 1950s and 'French exceptionalism', at least recently, also comes in European colours? We argue that a combination of three factors accounts for this variation in the extent to which nation state identities have become European. The first condition is that any new idea about political order, in order to be considered legitimate, must resonate with core elements of older visions of the political order such as 'state-centred republicanism' in France, 'parliamentary democracy and external sovereignty' in Great Britain, and 'federalism, democracy and social market economy' in Germany. These older understandings of political order therefore delimit the degree to which 'Europe' can be incorporated in given nation state identities. The second condition is that new visions about political order circulating in transnational discourses can most easily be promoted domestically during 'critical junctures' when existing ideas about political order are collectively challenged and contested. Under these circumstances, perceived political interests and the power resources of political actors to a large extent explain which ideas among those available in a given context are being promoted and come to dominate. Finally, nation state identities which have become consensual in a given polity are likely to remain rather stable over time, since actors tend to become socialized into their new collective identity and gradually internalize its content. Over time, nation state identities tend to become embedded in political institutions and political culture and the degree to which political elites are able to manipulate identity constructions narrows considerably.