Responsabilité démocratique et indépendance de la banque centrale : la Banque centrale européenne dans une perspective historique et comparative
By: ELGIE, Robert
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ArticlePublisher: Paris : IIAP, oct./déc. 1999Revue Française D'Administration Publique 92, p. 635-650Abstract: Employing a form of methodology which permits the evaluation of the independence of central banks, the comparison of the evolution of the central banks in Britain and in France since the 17th century locates the main focus of debate on the issue of democratic accountability. The aplication of this method to the European Central Bank, and a comparison with the British and French banks leads to a democratic deficit being identifiable within the European institution. Since a reform of the ECB's regulations does not appear timely, it is rather by way of modification of its modes of operation that this weakness may be remedied
Employing a form of methodology which permits the evaluation of the independence of central banks, the comparison of the evolution of the central banks in Britain and in France since the 17th century locates the main focus of debate on the issue of democratic accountability. The aplication of this method to the European Central Bank, and a comparison with the British and French banks leads to a democratic deficit being identifiable within the European institution. Since a reform of the ECB's regulations does not appear timely, it is rather by way of modification of its modes of operation that this weakness may be remedied
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