Inter-jurisdictional economic development : a political institution explanation for policy choice
By: HAWKINS, Christopher
.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: Philadelphia : Routledge, june 2010Subject(s): Administração Regional | Relações Intergovernamentais | Aspecto JurídicoInternational Journal of Public Administration - IJPA 33, 7, p. 379-389Abstract: This study examines the role of formal institutions and rules of government in the formation of joint venture agreements for economic development. Research suggests local governing arrangements play an influential role in the policy area of local economic development. This study presents an argument that form of government provides incentives that influence the decision to establish a developmental, redistributive, or regional interjurisdictional agreement. The results of a multinomial logit model using survey data collected from 12 metropolitan areas provides evidence to support the hypotheses that unreformed governing institutions, compared to cities with an appointed professional manager, are more likely to form joint venture agreements that are developmental in nature
This study examines the role of formal institutions and rules of government in the formation of joint venture agreements for economic development. Research suggests local governing arrangements play an influential role in the policy area of local economic development. This study presents an argument that form of government provides incentives that influence the decision to establish a developmental, redistributive, or regional interjurisdictional agreement. The results of a multinomial logit model using survey data collected from 12 metropolitan areas provides evidence to support the hypotheses that unreformed governing institutions, compared to cities with an appointed professional manager, are more likely to form joint venture agreements that are developmental in nature
Click on an image to view it in the image viewer
There are no comments for this item.