Discretion by the rules : European state aid policy and the 1999 procedural regulation
By: Zahariadis, Nikolaos
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ArticlePublisher: Oxfordshire : Routledge, oct. 2010Subject(s): Delegação | Institucionalismo | Modelo de Gestão | Regulação | Burocracia | Área de Livre Comércio | EuropaJournal of European Public Policy 17, 7, p. 954-970Abstract: The contribution assesses the effectiveness of the Procedural Regulation on the Commission's ability to control state aid. Using a principal-agent framework infused with insight from sociological institutionalism and data during the period 1992-2004, the study finds the Regulation strengthened the Commission's hand, reducing state aid. The study has implications for the single market and the literatures of international delegation and bureaucratic control
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The contribution assesses the effectiveness of the Procedural Regulation on the Commission's ability to control state aid. Using a principal-agent framework infused with insight from sociological institutionalism and data during the period 1992-2004, the study finds the Regulation strengthened the Commission's hand, reducing state aid. The study has implications for the single market and the literatures of international delegation and bureaucratic control
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