Who takes the hit? Ministerial advisers and the distribution of welfare state cuts
By: DAHLSTRÖM, Carl
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ArticlePublisher: Oxfordshire : Routledge, mar. 2011Subject(s): Orçamento Público | Burocracia | Fiscalização Orçamentária | Programação OrçamentáriaJournal of European Public Policy 18, 2, p. 294-310Abstract: This paper suggests a new way of analysing welfare state cutbacks. Instead of analysing the level of cuts, it analyses the way in which the cuts are distributed between social groups. It argues that we need to better understand the role of key bureaucrats in order to explain welfare state policy output, and thereby the distribution of cuts. In line with this argument, the paper suggests that ministerial advisers are influential in determining the character of policy output and that their actions partly depend on the terms of their employment. It hypothesizes that recommendations made by politically appointed advisers differ systematically from recommendations made by advisers who were not appointed politically, and that this also affects policy output. To test these suggestions, a set of 18 mature welfare states is used, and the results indicate that the ministerial advisers' terms of employment indeed influence the distribution of welfare state cuts
This paper suggests a new way of analysing welfare state cutbacks. Instead of analysing the level of cuts, it analyses the way in which the cuts are distributed between social groups. It argues that we need to better understand the role of key bureaucrats in order to explain welfare state policy output, and thereby the distribution of cuts. In line with this argument, the paper suggests that ministerial advisers are influential in determining the character of policy output and that their actions partly depend on the terms of their employment. It hypothesizes that recommendations made by politically appointed advisers differ systematically from recommendations made by advisers who were not appointed politically, and that this also affects policy output. To test these suggestions, a set of 18 mature welfare states is used, and the results indicate that the ministerial advisers' terms of employment indeed influence the distribution of welfare state cuts
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