Information, interest intermediaries and regulatory compliance
By: EUNGKYOON, Lee.
Material type: ArticlePublisher: Cary : Oxford University Press, jan. 2011Subject(s): Grupo de Pressão | Regulamentação | Política Ambiental | Meio Ambiente | Estados UnidosJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory 21, 1, p. 137-157Abstract: This research examines the role of interest intermediaries in helping to promote environmental regulatory compliance with a particular focus on their activities to facilitate the sharing of regulatory information. Although it is widely accepted that the provision of regulatory information to regulatees is crucial to enhancing compliance, the ability of regulatees to take advantage of the information provided is often limited. The research reported here addresses the gap between mere provision and actual utilization of regulatory information. With a case study of environmental compliance among Korean-American dry cleaners in Massachusetts, the research identifies the mechanism through which the interest intermediary can turn the extensive, heterogeneous network of information into systematic action-oriented capacity with a view to assisting complianceThis research examines the role of interest intermediaries in helping to promote environmental regulatory compliance with a particular focus on their activities to facilitate the sharing of regulatory information. Although it is widely accepted that the provision of regulatory information to regulatees is crucial to enhancing compliance, the ability of regulatees to take advantage of the information provided is often limited. The research reported here addresses the gap between mere provision and actual utilization of regulatory information. With a case study of environmental compliance among Korean-American dry cleaners in Massachusetts, the research identifies the mechanism through which the interest intermediary can turn the extensive, heterogeneous network of information into systematic action-oriented capacity with a view to assisting compliance
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