Emerging from two major wars (1996—97 and 1998—2002), the Democratic Republic of Congo is one of Africa’s most notoriously failed states. Since President Joseph Kabila came to power in 2001, the international community has invested significantly in efforts to rebuild the Congo. State-building efforts, however, have not achieved the expected results. International partners and the Congolese authorities share responsibility for failing to bring about genuine political change and institutional reconstruction. The former have underestimated the complexities of Congolese political culture while the latter deliberately hamper reform. Administrative weaknesses and the particular nature of public service provision in Congo constitute overwhelming obstacles to state-building. After presenting the different logics that motivate state-building and an overview of recent political history, the Congolese administrative reality will be discussed. Analysis will follow, revealing that implementing meaningful reform under the current framework is improbable.

Points for practitioners

This article is useful for professionals working in public management and administration because it offers arguments concerning: the importance of taking into account political culture for improved aid efficiency; the dangers of importing state-building ‘templates’ and standardized post-conflict reconstruction peace kits; the role played by national administrations in state-building and reform; the capacity of disillusioned public servants to hamper state-building and reform; lessons to be drawn from the DRC state-building and reform package for similar initiatives in other post-conflict and failed states.