Managerial dilemmas : the political economy of hierarchy
By: Miller, Gary J
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Material type: 
BookPublisher: New York : Cambridge University Press, 1992Description: 254 p.Subject(s): Tecnicas Gerenciais| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Livro Geral | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Livro Geral | 2.14M6481m (Browse shelf) | 1 | Available | 10005225 |
Part I - Why have hierarchy? Market failures and hierarchical solutions: the tension between individual and social rationality Bargaining failure: coordination, bargaining, and contracts Voting failure: social choice in a dictatotial hierarchy Part II: managerial dilemmas Horizontal dilemmas: social choice in a decentralized hierarchy Vertical dilemmas: piece-rate incentives and credible commitments Hidden action in hierarchies: principals, agents, and teams Hidden information in hierarchies: the logical limits of mechanism design Hierarchical failures and market solutions: can competition create efficient incentives for hierarchy? Part III: cooperation and leadership The possibilities of cooperation: repeated vertical dilemmas The indeterminacy of cooperation: conventions, culture, and commitment The political economy of hierarchy: commitment, leadership, and property rights
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