Quando leis não produzem os resultados esperados : financiamento eleitoral em perspectiva comparada
By: MARENCO, André
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ArticlePublisher: Rio de Janeiro : IESP / UERJ, 2010Online resources: Acesso Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais 53, 4, p. 821-853Abstract: Democracies have adopted different legislative models to regulate election finance: maximum limits to contributions, bans on donations by companies that provide public services or operate government concessions, and disclosure of private donations and public funds to cover campaign expenditures. The current studys underlying hypothesis is that there is no association between the legislations rigor and improvement in indicators of institutional transparency. The study analyzes the extent to which different types of institutional formats like democracy, presidentialism, type of electoral slate, and size of voting districts, as well as economic development variables, can explain the failure of electoral legislation to produce transparency in election finance.
Democracies have adopted different legislative models to regulate election finance: maximum limits to contributions, bans on donations by companies that provide public services or operate government concessions, and disclosure of private donations and public funds to cover campaign expenditures. The current studys underlying hypothesis is that there is no association between the legislations rigor and improvement in indicators of institutional transparency. The study analyzes the extent to which different types of institutional formats like democracy, presidentialism, type of electoral slate, and size of voting districts, as well as economic development variables, can explain the failure of electoral legislation to produce transparency in election finance.
ISSN 00115258 Versão Impressa
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