Holding the European Commission to account : the promise of delegated acts
By: JAN BRANDSMA, Gijs
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ArticlePublisher: Los Angeles : Sage, dec. 2016Online resources: Acesso International Review of Administrative Sciences 82, 4, p. 656-673Abstract: This article focuses on a new type of rules that the European Union may adopt: delegated legislation. Although this instrument may be new, it follows from a longstanding controversy over the means by which the European Parliament can hold the European Commission to account when it adopts executive rules. On the basis of interviews and documentary evidence, this article aims to test to what degree the new system delivers on its promise of stronger accountability. Although the new system is still in its infancy, the article concludes that formal rules, internal norms and practices are already indicative of stronger legislative control. However, capacity issues within the European Parliament, as well as a lack of public transparency, may well prove to be detrimental when the number of delegated acts increases
This article focuses on a new type of rules that the European Union may adopt: delegated legislation. Although this instrument may be new, it follows from a longstanding controversy over the means by which the European Parliament can hold the European Commission to account when it adopts executive rules. On the basis of interviews and documentary evidence, this article aims to test to what degree the new system delivers on its promise of stronger accountability. Although the new system is still in its infancy, the article concludes that formal rules, internal norms and practices are already indicative of stronger legislative control. However, capacity issues within the European Parliament, as well as a lack of public transparency, may well prove to be detrimental when the number of delegated acts increases
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