Above politics : bureaucratic discretion and credible commitment / Gary J. Miller, Andrew B. Whitford. --
By: Miller, Gary J.
Contributor(s): Whitford, Andrew B [autor].
Material type:
BookSeries: Political economy of institutions and decisions.Publisher: New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016Description: xii, 271 p. ; 23 cm.ISBN: 9781107008755 (hardback); 9781107401310 (paperback).Subject(s): Burocracia -- Estados Unidos
| Administração pública -- Aspecto ético -- Aspecto moral -- Estados Unidos | Serviço Público -- Aspecto ético -- Estados Unidos | Política Econômica -- Estados Unidos | Ciência Política -- História -- Teoria| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Livro Geral | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Livro Geral | 1.12 M6481a (Browse shelf) | Ex: 1 | Available | 2018-0690 |
Browsing Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos Shelves , Collection code: Livro Geral Close shelf browser
| 1.12 B9679 Burocracia e políticas públicas no Brasil: | 1.12 B9679 Burocracia e políticas públicas no Brasil: | 1.12 K1598l Liderança fora do quadrado : | 1.12 M6481a Above politics : | 1.12 N724b Bureaucracy and representative government / | 1.12 P4811c Comparing public bureaucracies : | 1.14 A3457a A auditoria operacional e seus desafios : |
Inclui bibliografia e índice.
1 - Introduction 2 - The moral hazard of bureaucrats and politicians 3 - Political moral hazard and credible commitment 4 - Political moral hazard and bureaucratic autonomy 5 - "Above Politics": The separation of powers and bureaucratic autonomy 6 - The control paradox, trust, and leadership 7 - Professionalism and credible commitment 8 - The politicization of financial regulation 9 - The financial crisis and reregulation 10 - Conclusion: The unraveling of Dodd-Frank
"Economic development requires secure contract enforcement and stable property rights. Normal majority-rule politics, such as bargaining over distributive and monetary policies, generate instability and frequently undermine economic development. Above Politics argues that bureaucracies can contribute to stability and economic development, but only if they are insulated from unstable politics. A separation-of-powers stalemate creates the conditions for bureaucratic autonomy. But what keeps delegated bureaucrats from being more abusive as they become more autonomous? One answer is the negotiation of long-term, cooperative relationships - that (when successful) typically bind subordinates to provide more effort in exchange for autonomy. Even more compelling is professionalism, which embeds its professional practitioners in professional norms and culture, and incidentally mitigates corruption. Financial examples are provided throughout the book, which ends with an analysis of the role played by professionalized bureaucracies during the Great Recession"--
"Above Politics argues that bureaucracies can contribute to stability and economic development, but only if they are insulated from unstable politics. A separation-of-powers stalemate creates the conditions for bureaucratic autonomy. But what keeps delegated bureaucrats from being more abusive as they become more autonomous? One answer is the negotiation of long-term, cooperative relationships - that (when successful) typically bind subordinates to provide more effort in exchange for autonomy"--
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