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Quiet politics and business power : corporate control in Europe and Japan / Pepper D. Culpepper. --

By: Culpepper, Pepper D.
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookSeries: Cambridge studies in comparative politics: Publisher: New York : Cambridge University Press, 2011 [reprinted 2012]Description: xviii, 227 p. --.ISBN: 9780521118590 (hardback); 9780521134132 (paperback).Subject(s): Governança Corporativa -- Europa | Governança Corporativa -- Japão
Contents:
Machine generated contents note: 1. Corporate control and political salience; 2. Patient capital and markets for corporate control; 3. The managerial origins of institutional divergence in France and Germany; 4. The Netherlands and the myth of the corporatist coalition; 5. Managers, bureaucrats, and institutional change in Japan; 6. The noisy politics of executive pay; 7. Business power and democratic politics. 1 - Corporate control and political salience 2 - Patient capital and markets for corporate control 3 - The managerial origins of institutional divergence in France and Germany 4 - The netherlands and the myth of the corporatist coalition 5 - Managers, Bureaucrats, and institutional change in Japan 6 - The noisy politics of executive pay 7 - Business power and democratic politics
Summary: "Does democracy control business, or does business control democracy? This study of how companies are bought and sold in four countries - France, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands - explores this fundamental question"--Provided by publisher.Summary: "Does democracy control business, or does business control democracy? This study of how companies are bought and sold in four countries, France, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands, explores this fundamental question. It does so by examining variation in the rules of corporate control ,specifically, whether hostile takeovers are allowed. Takeovers have high political stakes: they result in corporate reorganizations, layoffs, and the unraveling of compromises between workers and managers. But the public rarely pays attention to issues of corporate control. As a result, political parties and legislatures are largely absent from this domain. Instead, organized managers get to make the rules, quietly drawing on their superior lobbying capacity and the deference of legislators. These tools, not campaign donations, are the true founts of managerial political influence"--Provided by publisher.
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Item type Current location Collection Call number Copy number Status Date due Barcode
Livro Geral Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos
Livro Geral 4.05 C9681q (Browse shelf) Ex. 1 Available 2018-0691

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Machine generated contents note: 1. Corporate control and political salience; 2. Patient capital and markets for corporate control; 3. The managerial origins of institutional divergence in France and Germany; 4. The Netherlands and the myth of the corporatist coalition; 5. Managers, bureaucrats, and institutional change in Japan; 6. The noisy politics of executive pay; 7. Business power and democratic politics. 1 - Corporate control and political salience 2 - Patient capital and markets for corporate control 3 - The managerial origins of institutional divergence in France and Germany 4 - The netherlands and the myth of the corporatist coalition 5 - Managers, Bureaucrats, and institutional change in Japan 6 - The noisy politics of executive pay 7 - Business power and democratic politics

"Does democracy control business, or does business control democracy? This study of how companies are bought and sold in four countries - France, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands - explores this fundamental question"--Provided by publisher.

"Does democracy control business, or does business control democracy? This study of how companies are bought and sold in four countries, France, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands, explores this fundamental question. It does so by examining variation in the rules of corporate control ,specifically, whether hostile takeovers are allowed. Takeovers have high political stakes: they result in corporate reorganizations, layoffs, and the unraveling of compromises between workers and managers. But the public rarely pays attention to issues of corporate control. As a result, political parties and legislatures are largely absent from this domain. Instead, organized managers get to make the rules, quietly drawing on their superior lobbying capacity and the deference of legislators. These tools, not campaign donations, are the true founts of managerial political influence"--Provided by publisher.

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