Inclui bibliografia e índice.

Machine generated contents note: Part I. The Ubiquity of Aggregation: 1. Goals and trade-offs; 2. The debates surrounding social choice; 3. Social choice defended; Part II. A Theory of Legitimate Choice: 4. Legitimacy and choice; 5. Principles and legitimate choice; 6. A social choice theory of legitimacy; 7. Theory and method; Part III. Legitimate Policy Making in Practice: 8. Legislative legitimacy and judicial review; 9. Structuring discussion; 10. Administrative legitimacy; 11. Conclusion. PART 1 - THE UBIQUITY OF AGGREGATION; 1 - GOALS AND TRADE-OFFS 1.1 - Many goals, one choice; 1.2 - Structure of the book; 1.3 - Theory and method; 2 - THE DEBATES SURROUNDING SOCIAL CHOICE; 2.1 - The arrow and gibbard-satterthwaite theorems; 2.2 - Riker and the arbitrariness of democratic choice; 2.3 - Mackie's defense of democracy; 2.4 - Additional rebittals by democratic theory; 2.5 - Riker and his critics: unlikely allies?; 3 - SOCIAL CHOICE DEFENDED; 3.1 - Inputs to the aggregation problem; 3.2 - Unrestricted domain; 3.3 - Independence of irrelevant alternatives; 3.4 - Pareto efficiency; 3.5 - No dictator; 3.6 - Transditivity; PARTE II - A THEORY OF LEGITIMATE CHOICE; 4 - LEGITIMACY AND CHOICE; 4.1 - Legitimacy of what?; 4.2 - The bases of legitimacy; 5 - PRINCIPLES AND LEGITIMATE CHOICE; 5.1 - Characterizing legitimacy; 5.2 - Legitimate decison sequences; 6 - A SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY OF LEGITIMACY; 6.1 - Existence of legitimate procedures; 6.2 - Characterization of legitimate procedures; 6.3 - Streng thened notions of legitimacy 6.4 - Comparing principles; 6.5 - Conclusion; 7 - THEORY AND METHOD; 7.1 - Disagreeing about principles; 7.2 - Defining the set of possible choices; 7.3 - Actual versus perceived decision sequences; PART III - LEGITIMATE POLICY MAKING PRACTICE; 8 - LEGISLATIVE LEGITIMACY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW; 8.1 - Legislative rationality and judicial review; 8.2 - Rational basis review and legitimacy; 8.3 - Two-tiered review; 8.4 - Strict scrutiny and legitimacy; 8.5 - Linking judicial review and legitimacy; 9 - STRUCTURING DISCUSSION; 9.1 - Germaneness in the house of representatives; 9.2 - Single-subject provisions; 10 - ADMINISTRATIVE LEGITIMACY; 10.1 - Delegation and legitimacy; 10.2 - Agency explanations and avoiding nondelegation; 10.3 - Choosing principles: Limits on agency discretion; II - CONCLUSION; II.1 - Legitimacy and the inadequacy of structure; II.2 - Legitimacy and making sense of aggregation.

"Governing requires choices, and hence trade-offs between conflicting goals or criteria. This book asserts that legitimate governance requires explanations for such trade-offs and then demonstrates that such explanations can always be found, though not for every possible choice. In so doing, John W. Patty and Elizabeth Maggie Penn use the tools of social choice theory to provide a new and discriminating theory of legitimacy. In contrast with both earlier critics and defenders of social choice theory, Patty and Penn argue that the classic impossibility theorems of Arrow, Gibbard, and Satterthwaite are inescapably relevant to, and indeed justify, democratic institutions. Specifically, these institutions exist to do more than simply make policy - through their procedures and proceedings, these institutions make sense of the trade-offs required when controversial policy decisions must be made"--