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Game theory for applied economists / por Robert Gibboons. --

By: Gibbons, Robert.
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookPublisher: Nova Jersey, EUA : Princetn University Press, 1992Description: 267 p. : il.ISBN: 0691043086; 0691003955.Subject(s): Teoria dos Jogos | Economia
Contents:
1 Static Games of Complete Information 1.1 Basic Theory: normal-form games and Nash equilibrium 1.2 Applications 1.3 Advance theory: mixed strategies and existence of equilibrium 1.4 Futher reading 1.5 Problms 1.6 References 2 Dynamic Games of Complete Information 2.1 Dynamic games of complete and perfect information 2.2 Two-Stage games of complete but imperfect information 2.3 Repeated Games 2.4 Dynamic games of complete but imperfect information 2.5 Futher Reading 2.6 Problems 2.7 References 3 Static Games of Incomplete Information 3.1 Theory: static baysian games and Bayesian Nash equilibrium 3.2 Applications 3.3 The revelation principle 3.4 Futher reading 3.5 Problems 3.6 References 4 Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information 4.1 Introduction to perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 4.2 Signaling games 4.3 Other application of perfect Bayesian equilibrium 4.4 Refinements of perfect Bayesian equilibrium 4.5 Futher reading 4.6 Problems 4.7 References
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Livro Geral Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos
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1 Static Games of Complete Information 1.1 Basic Theory: normal-form games and Nash equilibrium 1.2 Applications 1.3 Advance theory: mixed strategies and existence of equilibrium 1.4 Futher reading 1.5 Problms 1.6 References 2 Dynamic Games of Complete Information 2.1 Dynamic games of complete and perfect information 2.2 Two-Stage games of complete but imperfect information 2.3 Repeated Games 2.4 Dynamic games of complete but imperfect information 2.5 Futher Reading 2.6 Problems 2.7 References 3 Static Games of Incomplete Information 3.1 Theory: static baysian games and Bayesian Nash equilibrium 3.2 Applications 3.3 The revelation principle 3.4 Futher reading 3.5 Problems 3.6 References 4 Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information 4.1 Introduction to perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 4.2 Signaling games 4.3 Other application of perfect Bayesian equilibrium 4.4 Refinements of perfect Bayesian equilibrium 4.5 Futher reading 4.6 Problems 4.7 References

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