1 Politics as a Game 1.1 Decision Versus Game Theoretic Decision Making 1.2 Preferences, Risk and Utility 1.3 Economics Versus Politics and Spatial Preferences 1.4 Collective Versus Individual Choice 1.5 Key Ideas and Concepts Exercises for Chapter 1 2 Extensive Forms, Voting Trees and Planning Ahead 2.1 Introduction 2.2 The Extensive Form 2.3 Voting Agendas 2.4 Games and Subgames 2.5 The Centipede Game: A Word of Caution 2.6 Key Ideas and Concepts Exercises for Chapter 2 3 The Strategic Form and Nash Equilibria 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Strategies and Simultaneous Choice 3.3 Nash Equilibria 3.4 Mixed Strategies 3.5 Mixed Strategies and Domination 3.6 Finding Mixed Strategy Equilibria 3.7 Manipulation and Incentive Compatibility 3.8 Key Ideas and Concepts Exercises for Chapter 3 4 Zero-Sum Games with Spatial Preferences 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Plott, McKelvey and the Core Results of Spatial Theory 4.3 Two-Candidate Elections and the Electoral College 4.4 Turnout and Responsible Political Parties 4.5 Multi-Candidate Elections 4.6 Candidate Objectives and Game-Theoretic Reasoning 4.7 The Strategy of Introducing New Issues 4.8 Elections with Uninformed Voters 4.9 Other Applications 4.10 Key Ideas and Concepts Exercises for Chapter 5 The Prisoners' Dilemma and Collective Action 5.1 The Prisoners' Dilemma 5.2 Some Simple Dilemmas in Politics 5.3 Cooperation and the Problem of Collective Action 5.4 Escaping the Dilemma: Repetition and Reputation 5.5 Constitutional Design and A Recursive Game 5.6 Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Corruption 5.7 Key Ideas and Concepts Exercises for Chapter 5 6 Agendas and Voting Rules 6.1 Agendas and Voting 6.2 Two Special Voting Rules and Peculiar Results 6.3 Two Alternative Rules for Electing Presidents 6.4 Controlling the Issues Voted On 6.5 Referenda and Separability of Preferences 6.6 Key Ideas and Concepts Exercises for Chapter 6 7 Games with Incomplete Information 7.1 Incomplete Information 7.2 A Simple Game of Incomplete Information 7.3 Bayes's Law and Bayesian Equilibrium 7.4 A Game with Two-Sided Incomplete Information 7.5 Agendas Reconsidered 7.6 Reputation and the Chain-Store Paradox 7.7 Signaling, Deception and Mutually Assured Destruction 7.8 Economic Sanctions in International Affairs 7.9 Rationality Reconsidered 7.10 Key Ideas and Concepts Exercises for Chapter 7 8 Cooperation and Coalitions 8.1 The Concept of a Coalition 8.2 Coalitions and Condorcet Winners 8.3 A Generalization-The Core 8.4 The Politics of Redistribution 8.5 The Core and Spatial Issues 8.6 Majority Rule Games Without Cores 8.7 Parliamentary Coalitions 8.8 Problems and Some Incomplete Ideas 8.9 The Balance of Power Versus Collective Security 8.10 Key Ideas and Concepts Exercises for Chapter 8 Appendix Index

"Strategy and Politics: An Introduction to Game Theory is designed to introduce students with no background in formal theory to the application of game theory to modeling political processes. This accessible text covers the essential aspects of game theory while keeping the reader constantly in touch with why political science as a whole would benefit from considering this method. Examining the very phenomena that power political machineries--elections, legislative and committee processes, and international conflict, the book attempts to answer fundamental questions about their nature and function in a clear, accessible manner. Included at the end of each chapter is a set of exercises designed to allow students to practice the construction and analysis of political models. Although the text assumes only an elementary-level training in algebra, students who complete a course around this text will be equipped to read nearly all of the professional literature that makes use of game theoretic analysis"--