The politics of the European Central Bank : principal-agent theory and the democratic deficit
By: ELGIE, Robert
.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: April 2002Subject(s): Banco Central | Área de Livre Comércio | Prestação de Contas | Reforma Política | Legitimidade | Democracia | EuropaJournal of European Public Policy 9, 2, p. 186-200Abstract: The institutional design of the European Central Bank (ECB) has been the subject of considerable political debate. In particular, it has been argued that the Bank suffers from a democratic deficit. This article applies the principal-agent approach to this debate so as to identify more dearly the logic that underpins the basic arguments about the democratic legitimacy of the ECB. Moreover, on the assumption that the Bank does suffer form a democratic deficit, the article also shows how principal-agent theory can point to the ways in which this problem may be addressed. Thus, the empirical and normative claims that underpin the debate about the accountability of the ECB and how it might be reformed
The institutional design of the European Central Bank (ECB) has been the subject of considerable political debate. In particular, it has been argued that the Bank suffers from a democratic deficit. This article applies the principal-agent approach to this debate so as to identify more dearly the logic that underpins the basic arguments about the democratic legitimacy of the ECB. Moreover, on the assumption that the Bank does suffer form a democratic deficit, the article also shows how principal-agent theory can point to the ways in which this problem may be addressed. Thus, the empirical and normative claims that underpin the debate about the accountability of the ECB and how it might be reformed
Click on an image to view it in the image viewer
There are no comments for this item.