Supranational institution-building in the European Union : a comparison of the European Court of Justice and the European Central Bank
By: HEISENBERG, Dorothee
.
Contributor(s): RICHMOND, Amyu.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: April 2002Subject(s): Área de Livre Comércio | Banco Central | Poder Judiciário | Relações Internacionais | Política Externa | HistoriaJournal of European Public Policy 9, 2, p. 201-218Abstract: The completion of the ECB provides an opportunity to compare how the EU builds new instituions. We compare two institutions(the bank and the court) which have a similar supranational status, but whose creation differed significantly. We examine the genesis of the two institutions and ask how the workings of these institutions have been affected by the initial mandate. We pose the question of wherther the ECB will lend itself to a realist interpretaion about the instituion's independence from member state interference similar to existing interpretations of the ECJ (Garrett 1995). Because of the different path set by the institutional design of the ECB, we conclude that the neorealist analysius of the ECJ-member state relationship is unlikely to resonate in the case of the ECB. We argue that the institutional creation of the ECJ and the ECB differed in four relevant ways: 1) the intended supranationalism of the initial design: 2) the specificity of the institution's mandate: 3) The institution's relationship to its national level. We find that each of these elements has significant implications for the institution's autonomy
| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Periódico | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Periódico | Not for loan |
The completion of the ECB provides an opportunity to compare how the EU builds new instituions. We compare two institutions(the bank and the court) which have a similar supranational status, but whose creation differed significantly. We examine the genesis of the two institutions and ask how the workings of these institutions have been affected by the initial mandate. We pose the question of wherther the ECB will lend itself to a realist interpretaion about the instituion's independence from member state interference similar to existing interpretations of the ECJ (Garrett 1995). Because of the different path set by the institutional design of the ECB, we conclude that the neorealist analysius of the ECJ-member state relationship is unlikely to resonate in the case of the ECB. We argue that the institutional creation of the ECJ and the ECB differed in four relevant ways: 1) the intended supranationalism of the initial design: 2) the specificity of the institution's mandate: 3) The institution's relationship to its national level. We find that each of these elements has significant implications for the institution's autonomy
Click on an image to view it in the image viewer
There are no comments for this item.