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Power as a determinant of executive compensation

By: GRABKE-RUNDEL, Arden.
Contributor(s): GOMEZ-MEJIA, Luis R.
Material type: materialTypeLabelArticlePublisher: 2002Subject(s): Alta Administração Privada | Salário | Mercado de Trabalho | ÉticaHuman Resources Management Review 12, 1, p. 3-23Abstract: Most empirical investigations on the disassociation between executive compensation and firm performance have been done using agency theory. Agency theory alludes to a power imbalance favorable to the executives, allowing therm to pursue their self-interest in the form of large pay packages. Howerver, because of its roots in the economic discipline, agency theory has led researchers to test financial rather than behavioral hypotheses. Over 70 years of research has been found. This paper attempts to incorporate behavioral conjectures of power into the agency theory framework to provide a comprehensive approach to testing executive pay. Agency theory is combinewd with the resource dependency theory and with specific measures of power developed by Finkelstein (1992) for a more complete executive pay model
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Periódico Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos
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Most empirical investigations on the disassociation between executive compensation and firm performance have been done using agency theory. Agency theory alludes to a power imbalance favorable to the executives, allowing therm to pursue their self-interest in the form of large pay packages. Howerver, because of its roots in the economic discipline, agency theory has led researchers to test financial rather than behavioral hypotheses. Over 70 years of research has been found. This paper attempts to incorporate behavioral conjectures of power into the agency theory framework to provide a comprehensive approach to testing executive pay. Agency theory is combinewd with the resource dependency theory and with specific measures of power developed by Finkelstein (1992) for a more complete executive pay model

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