Budgetary collective action problems : convergence and compliance under the maastricht treaty on European Union
By: SAVAGE, James D
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Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: American Society for Public Administration, 2001Public Administration Review: PAR 61, 1, p. 43-53Abstract: Budgetary agreements may be thought of as collective action problems in wich the problem at hand is maintaining group cohesion by controlling free riders. The standard solution to the free rider problem includes monitoring group behavior and imposing sanctions. This article analyzes the collective action problem present in the budgetary provision of the Maastricht Treaty, which created the Economic Monetary Union, by focusing on the four stages of budgetary compliance that are evident in all bugetary agreements and treaties
| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Periódico | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Periódico | Not for loan |
Budgetary agreements may be thought of as collective action problems in wich the problem at hand is maintaining group cohesion by controlling free riders. The standard solution to the free rider problem includes monitoring group behavior and imposing sanctions. This article analyzes the collective action problem present in the budgetary provision of the Maastricht Treaty, which created the Economic Monetary Union, by focusing on the four stages of budgetary compliance that are evident in all bugetary agreements and treaties
Public administration review PAR
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