Public choice economics and public pension plan funding : an empirical test
By: SCHENEIDER, Marguerite
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Contributor(s): DAMANPOUR, Fariborz.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: Thousand Oaks : SAGE, March 2002Administration & Society 34 , 1, p. 57-86Abstract: Public choice theory (PCT) assumers that elected officialos and public administrators act in their self-interest, not in the public interest. This article test the theory regarding the effects of public governance on U.S public pension plans, wich are increasingly important socioeconomic institutions. The authors develop several PCT-based hypotheses regarding the dependent variable of plan funding, a measure of plan performance. Data sources include bipositive relationship between the presence of boards of trustes and play funding is found but no relationship between citizen voting and plan funding
| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Periódico | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Periódico | Not for loan |
Public choice theory (PCT) assumers that elected officialos and public administrators act in their self-interest, not in the public interest. This article test the theory regarding the effects of public governance on U.S public pension plans, wich are increasingly important socioeconomic institutions. The authors develop several PCT-based hypotheses regarding the dependent variable of plan funding, a measure of plan performance. Data sources include bipositive relationship between the presence of boards of trustes and play funding is found but no relationship between citizen voting and plan funding
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