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Strategic voting in post-communist democracy

By: DUCH, Raymond M.
Contributor(s): PALMER, Harvey D.
Material type: materialTypeLabelArticlePublisher: 2002British Journal of Political Science 32, 1, p. 63-91Abstract: The absence of strategic voting in new democracies represents a potential threalt to democratic consolidation because it could inhibit the development of a stable party system. Yet can we expect that citizens in new democracies have developed the skills associated with strategic woting in democratic elections? Based on evidence from Hungary, a post-communist democracy, this article suggests that citizens in new democracies respond to strategic voting situations in a fashion consistent with conventional theories of strategic voting. Analysis of Hungarian voting statistics over the past three national elections indicates that voters, consistent with strategic voting theories, vigorously penalized smaller parties thereby contributing to the rapid decline in the number of effective parties smaller parties thereby contibuting to the rapid decline in the number of effective parties competing in Hungarina elections. We argue that strategic voting occurs in two stages: (1) recognitions of a `wasted-vote' situation and (2) strategic responses voting that situation. Evidence of strategic voting at the individual level consists of demonstrating that a sizeable number of voters have strategic responses to `wasted vote' situations and that these a responses correspond to the predictions of conventional strategic voting models. We conduct a proibit analysis of strategic voting using data from a 1997 national survey of Hungarian citizens. When faced with a `wasted vote' situation, 13.6 per cent of Hungarian survey respondents strategically switched their electoral support to another party. After controlling for recognition, informational factors proved inconsequential in explaining individual-level differences in strategic voting. Individual differences in issues and party preferences and the availability of co-ordination heuristics accounted for most of the heterogeneity in strategic voting among Hungarian survey respondents. These findings suggest that a sizeable percentage of citizens in nascent democracies respond strategically to `wasted-vote' opportunities
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The absence of strategic voting in new democracies represents a potential threalt to democratic consolidation because it could inhibit the development of a stable party system. Yet can we expect that citizens in new democracies have developed the skills associated with strategic woting in democratic elections? Based on evidence from Hungary, a post-communist democracy, this article suggests that citizens in new democracies respond to strategic voting situations in a fashion consistent with conventional theories of strategic voting. Analysis of Hungarian voting statistics over the past three national elections indicates that voters, consistent with strategic voting theories, vigorously penalized smaller parties thereby contributing to the rapid decline in the number of effective parties smaller parties thereby contibuting to the rapid decline in the number of effective parties competing in Hungarina elections. We argue that strategic voting occurs in two stages: (1) recognitions of a `wasted-vote' situation and (2) strategic responses voting that situation. Evidence of strategic voting at the individual level consists of demonstrating that a sizeable number of voters have strategic responses to `wasted vote' situations and that these a responses correspond to the predictions of conventional strategic voting models. We conduct a proibit analysis of strategic voting using data from a 1997 national survey of Hungarian citizens. When faced with a `wasted vote' situation, 13.6 per cent of Hungarian survey respondents strategically switched their electoral support to another party. After controlling for recognition, informational factors proved inconsequential in explaining individual-level differences in strategic voting. Individual differences in issues and party preferences and the availability of co-ordination heuristics accounted for most of the heterogeneity in strategic voting among Hungarian survey respondents. These findings suggest that a sizeable percentage of citizens in nascent democracies respond strategically to `wasted-vote' opportunities

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