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Learning disabilities for regulators : the perils of organizational learning in the air transportation industry

By: TAMUZ, Michal.
Material type: materialTypeLabelArticlePublisher: Thousand Oaks : SAGE, July 2001Administration & Society 33, 3, p. 276-302Abstract: In hazardous industries, regulatory agencies confront the dual mission of enforcing regulations while learning from experience. This research examines how incentives, designed for rule enforcement, influence the gathering and interpretation of hazard-related information that is essenctial for learning. It explores a high reliability theory argument that strict adherence to standard operating procedures can coexist with organizational learning from mishaps. Drawing on interviews with participants in aviation safety monitoring systems, the research analyzes archival data. The findings suggest that incentives for compliance alternatively decreased or increased the availabitiy of hazard-related information, depending on the seign system. The research supports a political therory of organizational reability
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Periódico Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos
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In hazardous industries, regulatory agencies confront the dual mission of enforcing regulations while learning from experience. This research examines how incentives, designed for rule enforcement, influence the gathering and interpretation of hazard-related information that is essenctial for learning. It explores a high reliability theory argument that strict adherence to standard operating procedures can coexist with organizational learning from mishaps. Drawing on interviews with participants in aviation safety monitoring systems, the research analyzes archival data. The findings suggest that incentives for compliance alternatively decreased or increased the availabitiy of hazard-related information, depending on the seign system. The research supports a political therory of organizational reability

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Escola Nacional de Administração Pública

Escola Nacional de Administração Pública

Endereço:

  • Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos
  • Funcionamento: segunda a sexta-feira, das 9h às 19h
  • +55 61 2020-3139 / biblioteca@enap.gov.br
  • SPO Área Especial 2-A
  • CEP 70610-900 - Brasília/DF
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