Control, bargains, and cheating : the politics of public-service reform
By: Hood, Christopher
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Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2002Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 12, 3, p. 309-332Abstract: This article aims to link together three themes in refor of public bureaucracy, focusing mainly on developed Westminster-type systems. The three themes are control in and over public bureaucracies, variety of types of public-service bargain between senior public officials and other actors in the political system, and strategic action or cheating over such bargains. The first part of the article identifies the idea of thermostatic control over the public service (by arms-lengthj steering, transparent targets, and negative feedback mechanisms) as a key theme in contemporary doctrines of public-service reform. The second part sketches out some of the observable variety in public-service bargains across political systems, and argues that the thermostatic approach to control is more likely to develop in public services with agency bargains than in those with trustee bargains. The thir part explores possibilities of cheating on the assumptions built into the thermostatic approach to control, arguing that the approach is far from cheat proof and can only be sustained in some conditions. The conclusion in that a PSB approach can help us to account for observe variety in contemporary public-service reform and for the surprisingly limited amount of full-blown managerialism that has developed in the era of new public management
| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Periódico | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Periódico | Not for loan |
This article aims to link together three themes in refor of public bureaucracy, focusing mainly on developed Westminster-type systems. The three themes are control in and over public bureaucracies, variety of types of public-service bargain between senior public officials and other actors in the political system, and strategic action or cheating over such bargains. The first part of the article identifies the idea of thermostatic control over the public service (by arms-lengthj steering, transparent targets, and negative feedback mechanisms) as a key theme in contemporary doctrines of public-service reform. The second part sketches out some of the observable variety in public-service bargains across political systems, and argues that the thermostatic approach to control is more likely to develop in public services with agency bargains than in those with trustee bargains. The thir part explores possibilities of cheating on the assumptions built into the thermostatic approach to control, arguing that the approach is far from cheat proof and can only be sustained in some conditions. The conclusion in that a PSB approach can help us to account for observe variety in contemporary public-service reform and for the surprisingly limited amount of full-blown managerialism that has developed in the era of new public management
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