The hunt for party discipline in congress
By: McCarty, Nolan
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Contributor(s): POOLE, Keith T | ROSENTHAL, Howard.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2001American Political Science Review 95, 3, p. 673-688Abstract: We analyze party discipline in the House of Representatives between 1947 and 1998. The effects of party pressures can be represented in a spatial model by allowing each party to have its own cutting line on roll call votes. Adding a second cutting line makes, at best, a marginal improvement over the standard single-line model. Analysis of legislators who switch parties shows, however, that party discipline is manifest in the location of the legislator`s ideal point. In contrast to our approach, we find that the Snyder-groseclose method of estimating the influence of party discipline is biased toward exaggerating party effects
| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Periódico | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Periódico | Not for loan |
We analyze party discipline in the House of Representatives between 1947 and 1998. The effects of party pressures can be represented in a spatial model by allowing each party to have its own cutting line on roll call votes. Adding a second cutting line makes, at best, a marginal improvement over the standard single-line model. Analysis of legislators who switch parties shows, however, that party discipline is manifest in the location of the legislator`s ideal point. In contrast to our approach, we find that the Snyder-groseclose method of estimating the influence of party discipline is biased toward exaggerating party effects
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