Interpreting Berlin`s liberalism
By: RILEY, Jonathan
.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2002American Political Science Review 95, 2, p. 283-296Abstract: I argue Isaiah Berlin`s pluralistic liberalism is best interpreted as a sophisticated form of liberal rationalism, as Berlin himself suggests. His value pluralism, even if it is viewed (as his critics typically view it, with considerable justifcation) as claiming that any choice between conflicting incommensurable values cannot be a rational choice, does not subvert his liberalism. Rather, this agonistic pluralism emanates from his liberal rationalism, which pictures reason as too weak to resolve conflicts of incommensurable. Yet, reason remains strong enough to discover that certain basic liberal values, including those associated with some minimum core of equal rights, are far more important than any competing values created by mankind. Belin apparently sees his pluraclistic liberal rationalism as a genuine rationalism that, in stark contrast to mainstream utopian rationalism which wildly exaggerate the power of reason, makes suitable room for the valid insight provided by the romantics
| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Periódico | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Periódico | Not for loan |
I argue Isaiah Berlin`s pluralistic liberalism is best interpreted as a sophisticated form of liberal rationalism, as Berlin himself suggests. His value pluralism, even if it is viewed (as his critics typically view it, with considerable justifcation) as claiming that any choice between conflicting incommensurable values cannot be a rational choice, does not subvert his liberalism. Rather, this agonistic pluralism emanates from his liberal rationalism, which pictures reason as too weak to resolve conflicts of incommensurable. Yet, reason remains strong enough to discover that certain basic liberal values, including those associated with some minimum core of equal rights, are far more important than any competing values created by mankind. Belin apparently sees his pluraclistic liberal rationalism as a genuine rationalism that, in stark contrast to mainstream utopian rationalism which wildly exaggerate the power of reason, makes suitable room for the valid insight provided by the romantics
Click on an image to view it in the image viewer
There are no comments for this item.