Why are japanese judges so conservative in politically charged cases?
By: RAMSEYER, J. Mark
.
Contributor(s): RASMUSEN, Eric B.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: , 2001American Political Science Review 95, 2, p. 331-344Abstract: Theory suggests that Japanese politicians have weaker incentives than U.S. politicians to keep lower court judges independent. Accordingly, we hypothesize that Japanese lower court judges who deer on sensitive political questions will do better in their careers. To teste this, we assemble several new data sets and measure the quality of the assignments received by about 400 judges after deciding various types of cases. We find that judges who deferred to the ruling party in politicaly salient disputes obtained better posts that those who did not, and that judges who actively enjoined the national government obtained worse posts that those who did not. We also hypotesize that judges with forthrightly leftist preferences do worse in their careers. We measure the speed at ahich the 500 judges hired during the 1960s moved up the pay sacle and find indications that judges who joined a lefitist group were promoted more slowly than their peers
| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Periódico | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Periódico | Not for loan |
Theory suggests that Japanese politicians have weaker incentives than U.S. politicians to keep lower court judges independent. Accordingly, we hypothesize that Japanese lower court judges who deer on sensitive political questions will do better in their careers. To teste this, we assemble several new data sets and measure the quality of the assignments received by about 400 judges after deciding various types of cases. We find that judges who deferred to the ruling party in politicaly salient disputes obtained better posts that those who did not, and that judges who actively enjoined the national government obtained worse posts that those who did not. We also hypotesize that judges with forthrightly leftist preferences do worse in their careers. We measure the speed at ahich the 500 judges hired during the 1960s moved up the pay sacle and find indications that judges who joined a lefitist group were promoted more slowly than their peers
Click on an image to view it in the image viewer
There are no comments for this item.